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In this article I develop a dynamic assignment model where matches are subjected to 
persistent idiosyncratic shocks. The model nests two independent models commonly used 
in the matching literature that have highlighted different aspects of the data. On one hand, 
there is ex ante heterogeneity as in traditional assignment models, so the equilibrium 
distribution of the match surplus between partners depends on the distributions of both 
types of agent characteristics in the economy (Roy (1951), Tinbergen (1951) and 
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957)). On the other hand, the model incorporates the fact that 
match outcomes are subjected to match–specific shocks, which may eventually lead to 
match termination (Jovanovic (1979)). I use the model to study the CEO - firm matching 
problem, an issue that has taken a lot of attention in recent work. (See for instance, Gabaix 




En este artículo se desarrolla un modelo dinámico de asignación, donde las parejas son 
sujetas a perturbaciones idiosincrásicas con persistencia. El modelo anida dos tipos de 
modelo de uso común en la literatura para analizar diferentes aspectos de los datos. Por un 
lado, se considera la heterogeneidad ex ante como es tradicional en los modelos 
tradicionales de asignación, por lo que en equilibrio la distribución de las rentas entre los 
miembros de una pareja depende de la distribución de las características de los agentes en 
la economía (Roy (1951), Tinbergen, (1951) y Koopmans y Beckmann (1957)). Por otra 
parte, el modelo incorpora el hecho de que el producto de una pareja está sujeto a 
perturbaciones específicas a la misma que pueden eventualmente conducir a terminar la 
relación (Jovanovic (1979)). El artículo utiliza el modelo para estudiar la relación gerente - 
firma, una cuestión a la que se le ha prestado mucha atención en trabajos recientes. (Véase, 
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In this article I develop a dynamic assignment model where matches are subjected to per-
sistent idiosyncratic shocks. In my model there are two types of heterogeneous agents that
have to match in order to produce. Production depends on agents’ ex ante characteristics,
but is also subjected to match - speciﬁc productivity shocks following a geometric Brownian
motion. Eventually, matches are destroyed, and agents go back to the market to search for
a new partner. The model is very tractable, allowing me to provide closed form solutions
that characterize both the equilibrium values of the agents and the equilibrium assignment
function.
The model nests two independent models commonly used in the matching literature that
have highlighted diﬀerent aspects of the data. On one hand, there is ex ante heterogeneity
as in traditional assignment models, so the equilibrium distribution of the match surplus
between partners depends on the distributions of both types of agent characteristics in the
economy (Roy (1951), Tinbergen (1951) and Koopmans and Beckmann (1957)). On the
other hand, the model incorporates the fact that match outcomes are subjected to match–
speciﬁc shocks, which may eventually lead to match termination (Jovanovic (1979)). The
model allows me to study the interaction between these two aspects of the matching problem
and enrich the number of facts that may be explained.
In particular, the model is useful for jointly understanding the cross section and time
series properties of partner incomes (i.e. how the surplus of the match is shared between
partners) and the evolution of matches. The model allows for partners’ incomes to vary
conditional on the other partner characteristics and over time. These are two features that
are prevalent in many situations, and that are ruled out in standard assignment models.
The model also permits me to study the interaction between partner characteristics and the
decision to break a match since, at least, match members outside options will be diﬀerent
across agents.
These are implications that are relevant for a variety of applications. As an example, con-
sider the case of an inventor that needs venture capital to transform his idea in a commercial
product. The success of the inventor-investor partnership depends on both the quality of
the inventor’s ideas and on the investor’s capacity to commercialize it, but it is also subject
to random shocks that will determine both the value and the life span of the partnership.
A similar problem arises when a ﬁrm is planning to invest in a new plant. Here the ﬁnal
output of the investment will depend on both the quality of the ﬁrm and the quality of the
plant. However, the ﬁnal outcome of the investment and how long the ﬁrm will keep the
plant will also depend on some match - speciﬁc shocks.
The application analyze in this article is the CEO - ﬁrm matching problem. In particular,
I use the model to characterize the equilibrium in the CEO - ﬁrm relationship, an issue that
has taken a lot of attention in recent work. For instance, Gabaix and Landier (2008) and
Tervio (2008) use assignment models to explain the huge and controversial increase in CEO
payments during the last 25 years. Both studies found that the large increase in CEO
payments is consistent with a competitive equilibrium where the rise in CEO compensation
is driven by the remarkable increase in ﬁrm size during the same period of time. Besides the
positive association between CEO compensation and ﬁrm size addressed by those papers,
1the data show large volatility and some degree of turnover. In fact, the data show that ﬁrm
size explain only around 15% of the variance in CEO earnings, that CEO turnover is around
10% every year, and that time series volatility of the growth of ﬁrm production (measure by
sales) is around 15%.
I calibrate the model to match aspects of both the cross section and time series behavior
of the top 1000 public traded ﬁrms in United States. More precisely, the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity process is calibrated to match time series aspects of the data like CEO tenure and
the time series behavior of sales. As is common in the assignment literature, the distribu-
tions of CEO and ﬁrm characteristics are calibrated to match the cross section relationship
between ﬁrm size, measured by its market value, and CEO compensation. The calibrated
model matches some key qualitative facts in the data, such as the positive skewed distribu-
tion of ﬁrm value and CEO earnings, ”Robert’s Law” (the elasticity between CEO earnings
and ﬁrm value), and the high volatility of CEO earnings conditional on ﬁrm size and volatil-
ity. On the down side, the calibrated model generates too–fat right tails in the distribution
of both ﬁrm values and CEO earnings.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 I present the model. In section 3 I analyze
a positive assortative equilibrium and proves its existence. In section 4 I calibrate the model,
present the results, and discuss the data. Finally, section 5 concludes. Proofs that are not
in the main text are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model
Time is continuous and lasts forever. The economy is populated by two classes of risk
neutral agents, that with an eye on the quantitative exercise below, I call ﬁrm owners (for
short ”ﬁrms”) and managers. Both classes of agents discount future ﬂows using the same
discount rate r. Without loss of generality, the mass of both class of agents is normalized
to one. Managers diﬀer in their capacity to manage a ﬁrm. In particular, throughout the
paper I assume that managers are characterized by a time invariant type m ∈ M ⊆ R+ that
is distributed according to the distribution function H (m). Firms are also heterogeneous.
Speciﬁcally, productivity types z ∈ Z ⊆ R+ are distributed according to the distribution
functionG(z).
The unit of production of the single good in this economy is a matched ﬁrm - manager
pair. Beyond manager and ﬁrm types, I let production depend on a match speciﬁc productiv-
ity shock a. The latter is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion with instantaneous
drift1   and instantaneous volatility σ2. The production ﬂow revenue of a ﬁrm - manager
pair (z,m) with idiosyncratic match productivity a is denoted by F (z,m,a). The next two
assumptions describe characteristics of the production technology more formally.
Assumption 1 Let t represent the time a pair (z,m) has been producing together and let
t = 0 denote initial time. For every pair (z,m) the match speciﬁc productivity a evolves
1The Brownian motion could be replaced by other diﬀusion process without altering any results. For




=  dt + σdBt, (1)
where Bt is a standard Wiener process and a0 > 0 is given and the same for every new
match.
Assumption 2 The production ﬂow F (z,m,a) is characterized as follows,
(i) F (z,m,a) = af (z,m), and
(ii) fzm (z,m) > 0.
Match speciﬁc productivity generates a surplus that has to be divided between the man-
ager and the ﬁrm. In this paper, as is common in the literature, I assume that any surplus
is divided according to a generalized Nash bargaining procedure with δ representing the
manager’s bargaining power.
Firm - manager pairs face a second source of uncertainty: with probability λ a match
is destroyed. This exogenous destruction rate reﬂects the fact that managers may leave the
ﬁrm or may be dismissed for reasons unrelated to ﬁrm performance. For example, a ﬁrm
could be sold or a manager may decide to leave for personal reasons.
Managers and ﬁrms meet in a competitive and frictionless matching market. Finally, for
both ﬁrms and managers there is a value of staying outside of the market denoted by V0 and
W0 respectively. I study the steady state of this economy.
2.1 Agents’ problem
Agents’ problem in this economy is twofold. First, any pair (z,m) decides, given their current
speciﬁc productivity level a, whether to stay matched or not. Second, if a match is broken,
ﬁrms and managers need to ﬁnd a new match among those unmatched in the market. Below
it is shown that under some mild assumptions, the solution to the ﬁrst problem is given
by a threshold productivity level such that whenever the match speciﬁc productivity goes
below the match is broken. The solution to the second problem is the solution to an optimal
assignment problem similar to the one studied by Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio
(2008).
Firm and manager values In steady state, ﬁrm and manager values depend only on their
types and on the level of match idiosyncratic productivity a. Let V (z) and W (m) be type z
ﬁrm and type m manager maximum expected present value at the beginning of a new match
(i.e. their outside option, since it is the best they can do after leaving their current match).
For any match with speciﬁc productivity a denote by M (z,m,a) the expected present value
of the match (z,m). Then the match surplus is given by
S (z,m,a) := M (z,m,a) − (V (z) + W (m)),
when match speciﬁc productivity is a.
3Denote by   V (z,m,a) the expected present value of a ﬁrm z currently managed by a
type m manager and by   W (z,m,a) the expected present value for a manager m currently
working for a ﬁrm z when the speciﬁc match productivity is a. Nash Bargaining implies that
  V (z,m,a) = V (z) + (1 − δ)S (z,m,a),
  W (z,m,a) = W (m) + δS (z,m,a),
That is, ﬁrm owner and manager expected present values are the sum of two components:
one exclusively related to their innate invariant characteristic and the other determined, in
part, by the (stochastic) performance of the match.
Partner selection and participation constraint Agents choose partners in order to
maximize their values at the beginning of the match   V (z,m,a0) and   W (z,m,a0). The
outcome of this process are matching sets M∗ (z) ∈ M and Z∗ (m) ∈ Z containing all
manager types hired by ﬁrms with productivity z and all ﬁrm types where type m managers
want to work for. More formally,
M
∗ (z) = argmax




∗ (m) = argmax
z′ {W (m) + (1 − δ)S (z
′,m,a)}. (3)
Of course, the outcome of the maximization problem has to be such that all agents make
more value in the market than outside it. The following participation constraint should be
satisﬁed for all z and m,
V (z) ≥ V0,
W (m) ≥ W0.
The value of a match and the termination policy Nash bargaining leads to eﬃcient
separation, and so both the ﬁrm and the manager agree when to break a match. Therefore,
the total expected present value of a match M (z,m,a) solves the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation
rM (z,m,a) =
F (z,m,a) + a Ma (z,m,a) + 1
2a2σ2Maa (z,m,a)
−λ(M (z,m,a) − V (z) − W (m)), (4)
where Ma and Maa are the ﬁrst and the second partial derivative of the match value with
respect to a. In words, the ﬂow value of match (z,m) is equal to the production ﬂow
F (z,m,a) plus a term that represents the eﬀects of idiosyncratic volatility, minus a third
term that represents the capital loss due to an unexpected break of a good match. In
the latter case, the current value of the match is replaced by the sum of ﬁrm owner and
manager outside options. The match is optimally broken at a idiosyncratic productivity level
a(z,m) such that Ma (z,m,a(z,m)) = 0 (smooth pasting condition) and M (z,m,a(z,m)) =
V (z) + W (m) (match value condition). Note that, as expected, the latter condition means
4that the match is optimally broken when match surplus (i.e. match value minus outside
options) is 0. The following proposition describes the value function and the termination
policy for any pair (z,m).
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(V (z) + W (m)), (5)








(V (z) + W (m)). (6)
Proof. See appendix.
2.2 A positive assortative steady state equilibrium
Denote the worst (best) manager and the worst (best) ﬁrm in the support by zL (zH) and mL
(mH) respectively. In a positive assortative equilibrium there exists an invertible assignment
function z∗ (m), with z∗ (mL) = zL, z∗ (mH) = zH and z∗′ (m) > 0 for all m ∈ M that
indicates for which ﬁrm a type m manager will work for. The inverse of this function, the
function m∗ (zL) := z∗−1 (zL), describes which manager will match a type z ﬁrm. The steady
state nature of the equilibrium means that this assignment does not change over time.
Deﬁnition 4 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium for this economy consists of the following ob-
jects: (1) an assignment function z∗ : M → Z, and (2) a termination rule a : Z × M → R
specifying when a match (z,m) is broken, such that (i) z∗ (m) ∈ Z∗ (m) for all m and (ii)
m∗ (z) ∈ M∗ (z) for all z.
Two comments are useful at this point. First, as it is shown below, under the assumptions
above, the unique steady state equilibrium is positive assortative. Therefore, deﬁning a
positive assortative steady state equilibrium is without loss of generality. Second, in a
positive assortative steady state equilibrium, when a match (z,m) is broken, a match of the
same type will be formed. Hence, the joint distribution of matches destroyed is identical to
the one corresponding to matches created.
53 A positive assortative equilibrium
In this section I construct and prove the existence of an equilibrium characterized by a
positive assortative matching between manager types and ﬁrm productivity levels determined
by the following function z∗ (m) = G−1 (H (m)). In what follows I will denote the worst (best)
manager and the worst (best) ﬁrm in the support by zL (zH) and mL (mH) respectively. As
was mentioned above, a positive assortative matching means that equilibrium assignment is
given by a function z∗ (m), with z∗ (mL) = zL, z∗ (mH) = zH and z∗′ (m) > 0 for all m ∈ M.
In equilibrium the assignment function z∗ (mL) correspond to the optimal selection of ﬁrms
by managers. The inverse of this function, the function m∗ (zL) := z∗−1 (zL), is then the
optimal selection of managers by ﬁrms. First I describe the equilibrium and then I show
that it is an equilibrium by showing that markets clear and nobody wants to deviate from
the equilibrium assignment.
3.1 Equilibrium description
Match value and break up decision If z∗ (m) is an equilibrium assignment, then
V (z∗ (m)) + W (m) = M (z∗ (m),m,a0). That is, the initial expected present value of
any equilibrium match has to be equal to the sum of the unmatched values of the ﬁrm and
the manager. Otherwise either the match would not incentive compatible (i.e. the total
value of the match is less than the sum of agents’ outside options) or part of the value would
not be assigned to any side of the match. Replacing this equality in equations (5) and (6)
plus a little of algebra, it is possible to compute the value and the termination decision rule
of an equilibrium match. In particular, it is easy to see that, as would be expected since
rematching is free, the cutoﬀ value is a = a0 for all equilibrium pairs and that the equilibrium
value of any equilibrium match is given by,
M (z
























is the same for all equilibrium pairs (z∗ (m),m).
An obvious concern in what follows is if participation constraints will be binding or not.
There are several ways to address this issue. Here, as in Tervio (2008), I took the following
shortcut. Note that M (z∗ (m),m,a0) is decreasing in the quality of both factors and assume
that production function f (.) goes to zero for very low values of z and m. Then, because
the match is positive assortative there is a pair (z,m) such that M (z,m,a0) = V0 + W0. I
call those levels zL and mL and re normalized the mass of types above them to 1. Then, the
participation constraint will be binding always for the lower types and only for them.
The value of unmatched ﬁrm and unmatched managers In order to ﬁnd the values
V (z) and W (m) consider the problem of an unmatched type z ﬁrm hiring a manager. They
know that in equilibrium a type m manager will require an expected present value equal to
6W (m). In this case, the owner of the ﬁrm will get a value (at the beginning of the match)
equal to M (z,m,a0)−W (m). In equilibrium it should be true that the owner of ﬁrm z∗ (m)
is better oﬀ hiring manager m than any other else, then for any ε > 0,
M (z
∗ (m),m,a0) − W (m) ≥ M (z
∗ (m),m + ε,a0) − W (m + ε).
Dividing both side by ε and letting ε → 0, I get the following equilibrium condition
W
′ (m) = Mm (z
∗ (m),m,a0),
which is just the FOC of the problem in equation (2). In order to obtain the equilibrium
value of an unmatched type m manager, I integrate last expression over m, and use the
fact that in equilibrium the value of the match is M (z∗ (m),m,a0) = f (z∗ (m),m)Φ(a0)
and that the assignment is positive assortative. Then, the present expected value of an
unmatched manager should be equal to,





As noted above, participation constraint is exactly binding for the manager with the lowest
talent mL. A similar procedure implies that a type z ﬁrm has a value when unmatched equal
to





where m∗ (x) := z∗−1 (x).
The equilibrium assignment function Before describing the assignment function, it
is necessary to ﬁnd the intensity at which match are terminated. The next proposition
describes the speciﬁc productivity steady state density and the aggregate turn over rate.
Proposition 5 Let J∗ =
  
−  − σ2
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> 2, then the ergodic distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is
γ (a) = (1 − R2)a
1−R2
0 a
R2−2, a ∈ (a0,∞)





















7As was stated above, every match starts with a productivity level a0 that evolves ac-
cording to equation (1). Matches are “killed” at rate λ by exogenous separations and are
endogenously stopped when the idiosyncratic productivity falls from a0. My interpretation
of this two types of turnover is the following. The ﬁrst is ”voluntary” turn over (i.e. turn
over that is not related with ﬁrm performance) and the second is the so called ”forced” turn
over (i.e. the one related with poor performance of the ﬁrm).
Markets clear when the unmatched mass of any subset of manager types equals the
mass of unmatched ﬁrms looking for those managers. Since matches are broken at intensity
ω, positive assortative matching between managers and ﬁrms implies that market clearing






where mL and zL are the lowest talent manager and the lowest quality ﬁrm respectively.
Taking derivative with respect to m, it is clear that the matching function has to solve the






with boundary conditions given by the value of the assignment at each extreme of the support
of m. The solution to this equation is given by,
z
∗ (m) = G
−1 (H (m)),
which, as in standard assignment models, says that the equilibrium assignment depends only
on the distributions of match side characteristics.
3.2 Equilibrium existence
Proposition 6 A positive assortative equilibrium exists.
To show that the equilibrium described above is actually an equilibrium, it is necessary to
show that nobody wants to deviate from the equilibrium assignment.2 That is, an unmatched
manager m prefers to work for a ﬁrm z∗ (m) rather than for any other one, and viceversa.
I consider a permanent deviation in which an arbitrary type m manager decides to work
always for a ﬁrm z diﬀerent from z∗ (m). Under this deviation, the initial expected present
value of the match (z,m) is just f (z,m)Φ(a0), since the same match is repeated again and
again. The owner of a type z ﬁrm will not accept at the moment of match creation a
value less than V (z). Then, the manager will get f (z,m)Φ(a0)−V (z) instead of W (m) =
M (z∗ (m),m,a0) − V (z∗ (m)) every time she starts a new match. Therefore, in order the
deviation not to be proﬁtable the following condition is required
f (z,m)Φ(a0) − V (z) ≤ M (z
∗ (m),m,a0) − V (z
∗ (m)) , ∀z ∈ Z. (10)
2Of course, it is also necessary to have market in equilibrium, but this is true under the assignment
proposed here.
8Using equation (9) and (7), condition (10) could be written as follows





∗ (x))dx , ∀z ∈ Z. (11)
By supermodularity of f (.) equation (11) is always true. To see that, consider starting
at any equilibrium pair (z∗ (m),m). Note that both sides of equation (11) are zero at
z = z∗ (m) and that the the derivative of the right hand side with respect to z is fz (z,m)
and the derivative of the left hand side is fz (z,m∗ (z)). When z = z∗ (m) both derivatives
are equal. When z > z∗ (m) because the assignment is positive assortative m∗ (z) > m and
by supermodularity fz (z,m∗ (z)) > fz (z,m). When z < z∗ (m) the opposite is true, since
it is the case that m∗ (z) < m and by supermodularity fz (z,m∗ (z)) < fz (z,m).
Note this also implies that in any stationary equilibrium, where ﬁrms of certain type
match always with managers of the same type, the only assignment that is incentive com-
patible is the one proposed in this section. Therefore, as was claimed above, the unique
stationary equilibrium is a positive assortative one.
Finally, note that since the outside option of both managers and ﬁrm owners is inde-
pendent of their current match, it should be the case that if a permanent deviation is not
proﬁtable, neither is any transitory deviation. So the above argument is enough to estab-
lished the optimality of the equilibrium assignment.
4 An application to CEO compensation and turn over
Empirical studies of CEO compensation (see Murphy (1999) for a survey) have been mostly
model - free. Only recently have there been some attempts to write down models that could
be calibrated and used in empirical analysis. In particular, Gabaix and Landier (2008) and
Tervio (2008) use assignment models to explain the huge and controversial increases in CEO
pay during the last years. Both studies found that the large increase in CEO pay could be a
phenomenon ocurring in a competitive equilibrium, driven by the increase in ﬁrm size during
the same period of time. In spite of their success, those models are still very abstract and
mute on some important issues like manager turnover and compensation volatility. Another
aspect of recent assignment models that is at odds with the data is that those models
predict, conditional on ﬁrm size, no variance in CEO pay. The introduction of match -
speciﬁc productivity allows me to explore these dimensions of the data.
First, I present the data that motives the use of this model to study the behavior of
CEO earnings and ﬁrm values. Then I calibrate the model and present the results. Before
that, I brieﬂy discuss how I to compute the per period ﬂow in the model, since the model
gives equations for present expected values, while the CEO earnings data are in per period
payments.
Per period payments The model gives equations for expected present values for ﬁrm
and managers. However, in the case analyzed here and in other applications, there are only
data on per period payments. There is no unique way of converting those expected present
values into per period ﬂows, since the model does not specify how such a division should be
9done. The method that I use in the quantitative application below is to exploit the HJB
equation of each agent. For example, in the case of the manager, it has to be true that the
solution above solves the following HJB equation
r  W (z,m,a) =
w(z,m,a) + a   Wa (z,m,a) + 1
2a2σ2  Waa (z,m,a)
−λ
 
  W (z,m,a) − W (m)
  , (12)
where w(z,m,a) is the per period ﬂow, which could be calculated from the equations above
that describe   W (z,m,a) and W (m).
4.1 CEO’s payment and ﬁrm value data
For calibration I consider the top 1000 public traded US companies in 2004 ExecuComp
database3
CEO compensation includes options, which are priced using the standard Black-Scholes
formula. The same data have been used in many other studies of CEO compensation includ-
ing Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008). Table 1 presents some statistics. Average
CEO total compensation in 2004 was $7.12 million, ranging between zero and slightly more
than $120 million. The standard deviation is huge: around 8.4 million, that is, 1.18 times
the average. The distribution of wages is positive skewed (skewness coeﬃcient is equal to
5.14) reﬂecting that there is a larger than normal mass of very well paid CEOs. Table 1 also
presents some summary statistics of ﬁrm value. The average top 1000 ﬁrm in 2004 has a
value around $12,500 million. As with CEO compensation, there is a huge variance within
this group of top ﬁrms. Firm values range from 1,172 to 385,882 million, with a standard
deviation equal to 29,949 million, that is 2.4, times the average. Firm value distribution
is also very positive skewed (skewness coeﬃcient is equal to 6.69) reﬂecting that there is a
larger than normal mass of very large ﬁrms.
It has been argued, both theoretically and empirically, that CEO compensation should
be positive correlated with the size of the ﬁrm. In particular, it is commonly assumed that a
CEO compensation to ﬁrm market value elasticity around 0.33 is a good description of the
data. Based on this review of the literature, Gabaix and Landier (2008) named this rela-
tionship ”Robert’s Law”. To evaluate the relationship between ﬁrm size and CEO payments
I run the following regression
log(CEO wages) = β0 + β1 log(Firm V alue).
The estimated value of β1 is 0.4083 with a standard deviation of 0.0301. As expected,
there is a strong and clear relationship between ﬁrm size and CEO compensation. However,
the R2 of the regression is only 0.1557, meaning that a huge part of CEO compensation
variance can not be explained by variation in market value. Figure 1 plots the log of CEO
compensation against the log of ﬁrm market value, as well as the ﬁtted values from the
above regression. It is clear from the ﬁgure that conditional on market value there is a large
variance in CEO compensation.
3For comparability purpose, data used in this paper is the same data as in Tervio (2008).
10CEO Pay Firm Value
Mean∗ 7.12 12,584.64





Table 1: Summary statistics

































Figure 1: Log of CEO’s compensation and ﬁrms value.
11With respect to CEO turn over, studies reveal that some number between 10% and 15% of
CEOs leave their position in a typical year. The numbers diﬀer because samples are diﬀerent
and because diﬀerent deﬁnitions of ”leave” are used. For example, Kaplan and Minton (2006)
ﬁnd that CEO turnover is around 14.9% a year when external turnover (turnover primarily
related to ﬁrm acquisitions) is taken into account, and only 11.8% when external turn over
is not considered, as is common in most of the literature. A related deﬁnitional issue has
been the diﬀerence between forced and unforced turnover. From a theoretical point of view
it is not the same if a CEO leaves the ﬁrm because of she retires or other personal reasons
or because he was ﬁred (see Parrino (1997) for a commonly used deﬁnition of forced and
unforced turnover). Studies that have tried to identify both types of turnover in the data
have found that unforced turnover is much larger than forced. Jenter and Kanaan (2006)
report that in their sample the average percentage of ﬁrms with at least one CEO turnover
in a year was 9.47%, while the same statistic considering only forced turnover gives a number
around 2.36%.
4.2 Calibration and results
There are three types of objects to be calibrated to bring the model to the data. First, it
is necessary to make assumptions about functional forms, including CEO talent and ﬁrm
quality distributions across the economy. Second, since the idea is to match the very top
valued ﬁrms and CEO wages, it is necessary to specify which part of those distributions to
use. Finally, there are a number of parameters to calibrate including those governing the
evolution of the idiosyncratic match productivity.
Functional forms Functional forms are taken, unless otherwise mentioned, from Gabaix and Landier
(2008). The production function is given by
F (z,m,a) = Az (ψ + m)a,
where A and ψ are constants and, as before, parameters z, m and a are ﬁrm type, manager
talent and idiosyncratic productivity respectively. Note that A is just an scale parameter,
but that parameter ψ aﬀects the marginal productivity of ﬁrm quality (conditional on man-
ager talent) without aﬀecting manager marginal productivity4. With respect to factor type
distributions the functional forms used are
H (m) = 1 − (1 − m)
1
a ,
with a = 0.6 and m ∈ [0,1] for managerial talent and






with b = 1 and z ∈ [1,∞) for ﬁrm productivity.
4At this point it is useful to remember that in assignment models the term marginal productivity should
be used with caution, since production factors (ﬁrm quality and managerial talent) are not divisible.
12In Gabaix and Landier (2008) the authors interpreted z directly as the size of the ﬁrm,
and so G(z) is by deﬁnition the size distribution of ﬁrms. Here I depart from Gabaix and Landier
(2008) by thinking about z as a non observable ﬁrm characteristic and calibrating the model
such that the resulting ﬁrm size, measured by ﬁrm value, is consistent with the actual size
distribution.
In calibrating the model it is easier to work with the quantiles rather than the levels
of talent and productivity. In particular, let nz and nm be numbers between 0 and 1 that
represent the rank of the ﬁrm and the manager, being 0 the highest rank and 1 the lowest.
Note that by inverting the distribution function above it is possible to write the talent and
the type of the ﬁrm in terms of the rank. Using the fact that assortative matching implies
that in equilibrium nz = nm = n, the CEO talent and ﬁrm productivity could be written as
a function of the rank n as follows,
m(n) = 1 − n
a,
z (n) = z0n
−b,
It is important to note that, because of the idiosyncratic productivity component that
has been added to the model, the rank n could not be mapped to the actual rank of ﬁrm
value or CEO compensation as was done by Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008).
With this transformation in mind it is possible to rewrite the equations in the model
in the following way. Remember that M (z,m,a) = f (z,m)Φ(a) then, using equations
in section 3.1, it is possible to write the value of unmatched CEO and unmatched ﬁrm as
follows,
























where the tilda means that the functions depend on n instead of z and m. As in Gabaix and Landier
(2008) this expression could be simpliﬁed by noting that for very low n (that is for the top
ﬁrms in the economy) both W0 and V0, the value of the lowest manager in the economy and
the value of the smallest ﬁrm (both conditional on starting a new match at a0), are very low
compared to the value of the top ranked ﬁrm and and the compensation of the top ranked
CEO. Then I set both values equal to 0.
The rank of the worst ﬁrm - manager pair (n∗) As was mentioned above, n represents
the rank of both CEO talent and ﬁrm type. This is a number that goes from 0, representing
the largest ﬁrm in the economy, to 1, representing the smallest one. The question is which
is the rank of the top 1000 ﬁrm in United States, the smallest ﬁrm in the sample, but not
the smallest in the economy. To calibrate this number I match the ratio of the standard
deviation of ﬁrm value to the average ﬁrm value. In the model, for a given value of δ, this
ratio depends only on the distribution of a, which parameters are pinned down independently
from ﬁrm quality and CEO talent distributions as shown below, and on n∗. The ratio is
equal to 2.3807 in the data.
13Firm size CEO pay
Data Simulation Data Simulation
mean* 12627.25 12627 7.1763 7.1623
median* 4143.97 6890 4.8128 6.3499
standard deviation* 30061.09 30137 8.4039 8.3612
skewness 6.6692 73.1443 5.1471 89.9540
* millions of dollars
Data Simulation
Forced CEO turn over 2.36% 2.36%
Total CEO turn over 9.47% 9.63%
Table 2: Matched moments
Parameters The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows. Starting with parameters
governing the idiosyncratic process, σ is set to 14% to match the weighted standard deviation
of the growth rate of nominal sales of 14% (see Comin and Mulani (2006)) and   is set to
match forced turnover which is around 2.36% a year. Parameter λ is set to match total
turnover of 9.47%. Production function parameters are selected to match other moments of
the data. In particular, A is chosen to match the average wage and ψ to match, given A, the
size of the average ﬁrm. Finally, manager’s bargaining power δ is set at 0.00362 to match
the volatility of CEO compensation.
Firm and wage distribution Table 2 presents the moments matched in the calibration:
means and standard deviations of ﬁrm size and CEO compensation. The median and the
skewness are also presented. Numbers in data column diﬀer a little bit from Table 1 because
I exclude ﬁrms paying less than $0.1 million.
The model results show that both the predicted median and the predicted skewness
coeﬃcients are greater than in the data, meaning that the calibrated distribution of ﬁrm
values and CEO earnings are more concentrated on the right tail than in the data. The
reason is that, in order to match a turnover rate of 9.47% when the standard deviation of
the shock is set at 14%, I need a high level of   (the drift of the process) , so there are a bunch
of ﬁrms that grow a lot (i.e. there are a lot of them in the upper tail of the distribution).
CEO compensation and ﬁrm value As before, to evaluate the relationship between
ﬁrm size and CEO payments I run the following regression
log(CEO wages) = β0 + β1 log(Firm V alue).
Using the data generated by the model, the value of β1 is 0.2166 (standard deviation 0.001).
That means that, on average, an increase of 1% in the value of a ﬁrm will raise CEO
compensation by around 0.21%. This elasticity is lower than the 0.33 that has been found
in the literature. Again, the reason is the presence of a positive drift that, since the largest
part of the surplus goes to ﬁrms (δ is very low), aﬀects the value of ﬁrms more than it does
CEO compensation. The R2 of this regression is 33%, meaning that in the model as in the
data there is a lot of variance in CEO compensation conditional ﬁrm size.
14As a summary, the calibrated model matches qualitative key facts in the data, such as the
positively skewed distributions of ﬁrm value and CEO earnings, ”Robert’s Law” describing
the sensitivity between CEO earnings and ﬁrm value, and the high volatility of CEO earnings
conditional on ﬁrm size and volatility. Quantitatively, the calibrated model highlights the
trade oﬀ between matching low managerial turnover and having a ﬁrm size distribution closer
to the data when a geometric Brownian motion is used to describe the evolution of match -
speciﬁc shocks. The main issue is that with a geometric Brownian motion characterizing the
evolution of speciﬁc match productivity, the only way to obtain a low turnover is by having
a positive drift term that increase the mass of the right tail of the distribution. One way
to solve this problem in future empirical applications of this model could be to replace the
geometric Brownian motion process by a mean reverting one, like the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter I present a tractable and calibratable model that puts together the two
main models used to explain economic situations where agents needs to match in order to
produce: the assignment and the match idiosyncratic productivity literature. I show that,
in the model, supermodularity of the production function is a suﬃcient condition for a
positive assortative stationary equilibrium to exist. The model could be solved analytically,
and so I provide equations that characterize both equilibrium agent values and equilibrium
assignment function.
The model could be used to explain jointly cross sectional and time series dimensions of
the data. In the quantitative part of the chapter, the model is calibrated to match aspects of
both the cross sectional and time series behavior of the top 1000 public traded ﬁrms in the
United States. In particular, the idiosyncratic productivity process is calibrated to match
time series aspects of the data CEO turnover rate and the behavior of ﬁrm growth sales. As
is common in the assignment literature, the distributions of CEO and ﬁrm characteristics
are calibrated to match the cross sectional relationship between ﬁrm size, measured by its
market value, and CEO compensation. The calibrated model matches qualitatively the main
facts in the data, but generates too fat right tails in the distribution of both ﬁrm values and
CEO earnings.
There are many possible future applications of the model. For example, one of the more
surprising ﬁndings of recent assignment models is that, in spite of the immense diﬀerence
among top paid CEOs, the “implicit” diﬀerence in CEO talent is very small. That is, a
large portion of the diﬀerence in CEO earnings comes from the fact that top paid CEOs are
assigned to larger ﬁrms and not from diﬀerences in their innate talent. From a quantitative
point of view, allowing for compensation volatility conditional on manager talent could be
important when backing out the managers’ talent distribution from wage and ﬁrm size
data. The literature has basically to ﬁltered out cases of small (large) ﬁrms that pay large
(small) compensation to their CEO. However, this requires a mechanism to relate directly
the distribution of talent and ﬁrm characteristics to observable data when the outcome of
the match also depends on some idiosyncratic shock.
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16A Proof of proposition 3
For every pair (z,m) the value of the match solves5











, if a > a(z,m)
M (z,m,a) = V (z) + W (m), if a ≤ a(z,m) (13)
with value matching conditions
M (z,m,a) = V (z) + W (m), (14)
smooth pasting conditions
Ma (z,m,a) = 0, (15)








  M (z,m,a) =
1
r
[af (z,m) + λ(V (z) + W (m))].





































+ 2σ2 (r + λ).






















(V (z) + W (m)). (17)








(V (z) + W (m)). (18)
B Proof of proposition 5











































′′ (a) − (λ −  )γ (a).
The general solution to this equation is





























+ 2σ2 (λ −  ).
Then
γ (a) = c1a
R1−2 + c2a
R2−2, a ∈ (a0,∞).
Because it is a density function it has to be the case that,
γ (a) ≥ 0, (19)
 
γ (a) = 1, (20)














c2 = (1 − R2)a
1−R2
0 ,
and then stationary density function is given by,
γ (a) = (1 − R2)a
1−R2
0 a
R2−2, a ∈ (a0,∞).
C Aggregate turnover
Note that the expected conditional tenure solves the following diﬀerential equation
−1 =  aτ




′′ (a) − λτ (a) = 0.
By inspection the general solution is






































τ (a0+) = 0.
When a = ∞ the tenure depends only on the exogenous destruction rate λ. When a = a0
tenure is zero, therefore, c1 = 0. Then
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.
I compute the aggregate unconditional turnover as 1
τ.
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